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Abstract
The rational solution of the Monty Hall problem unsettles many people. Most people, including the authors, think
it feels wrong to switch the initial choice of one of the three doors, despite having fully accepted the mathematical proof
for its superiority. Many people, if given the choice to switch, think the chances are fifty-fifty between their options,
but still strongly prefer to stay with their initial choice. Is there some sense behind these irrational feelings?
We entertain the possibility that intuition solves the problem of how to behave in a real game show, not in the
abstract textbook version of the Monty Hall problem. A real showmaster sometimes plays evil, either to make the show
more interesting, to save money, or because he is in a bad mood. A moody showmaster erases any information advantage
the guest could extract by him opening other doors which drives the chance of the car being behind the chosen door
towards fifty percent. Furthermore, the showmaster could try to read or manipulate the guest’s strategy to the guest’s
disadvantage. Given this, the preference to stay with the initial choice turns out to be a very rational defense strategy
of the show’s guest against the threat of being manipulated by its host. Thus, the intuitive feelings most people have
about the Monty Hall problem coincide with what would be a rational strategy for a real-world game show. Although
these investigations are mainly intended to be an entertaining mathematical commentary on an information-theoretic
puzzle, they touch on interesting psychological questions.
The Monty Hall problem
The textbook Monty Hall problem [1, 2] goes as follows. A
showmaster presents you three doors to choose from. Be-
hind one is a sports car that you win if you decide to open
this door. Behind the others are goats that have no value
to you. You indicate a choice, but before you open the cho-
sen door, the showmaster opens another one, revealing a
goat, and gives you the opportunity to revise your choice.
Should you stay with your choice or should you switch to
the other door?
The implicit assumption is that the showmaster always
behaves in this way. In this case the optimal strategy can
be found by various lines of argument. Your initial prob-
ability of picking the right door is 1/3. If your strategy is
to always stay with your choice, this is your probability
of winning the car, irrespective of whether the showmaster
opens zero, one, or both other doors. In 2/3 of the cases the
car is behind one of the other doors. The showmaster is
so friendly as to indicate which of those is certainly wrong.
So, if you switch, and the car is behind one of the other
doors, he guides you to the good one. This will work in
2/3 of the cases, which is then the chance of winning if you
switch.
So far so good. Logic has shown us what to do best.
But – it just feels wrong. It feels so wrong that approxi-
mately 10, 000 readers of Marilyn vos Savant’s column “Ask
Marilyn” write to her to say that she must be erring after
she had explained the correct solution to the Monty Hall
problem. Among them, nearly 1, 000 holders of PhDs [3].
Why don’t they (and we) trust Marilyn? Well, probably,
because for this we also have to trust the showmaster!
The evil showmaster
Imagine the textbook assumption is wrong that the show-
master always behaves in the described way. Real showmas-
ters can and occasionally do behave differently. Imagine the
worst case: the showmaster is evil [4] and opens other doors
only if you pick the door with the car. Thus, if you pick a
door with a goat, he will immediately open it and you lose.
This happens in 2/3 of the cases. In 1/3 of the cases you pick
the door with the car. Then, the evil showmaster opens
another one in the hope that you play switch as you have
learned this to be superior. In that case you lose as well.
So if you always play switch and the showmaster plays evil,
you always lose. However, if you play stay, you win in 1/3
of the cases, namely, whenever you initially picked the door
with the car. The showmaster cannot change this. Just be
stubborn and ignore the seduction of a virtual additional
chance of 1/3 by switching and you defend the guaranteed
1/3 winning chance of your initial choice.
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A showmaster always playing evil would save the broad-
casting company real money. Only 1/3 of the stay-people
get cars, and all the switch-people get only goats. However,
he might ruin the show. It would become boring and people
would stop watching it. Therefore, he should behave in an
evil way only with some frequency p. And he should tai-
lor this frequency to create maximal suspense while cutting
financial losses.
Optimal moodiness
In order to optimally choose his frequency p of playing evil
the showmaster has to consider the situation of his guests.
For this, he had better assume that whatever frequency p he
chooses, this will also be known to his guests. They might
obtain this number by studying broadcasts of the show or
by performing the same calculation as he does to determine
his optimal moodiness, as we will do in the following as well.
Imagine that you have made your initial choice, and he
has opened another door, revealing a goat. Should you now
stay or switch? In the fraction p of the cases when his mood
is evil you had better stay, ensuring your winning probabil-
ity of 1/3. If you switch in this case, you surely lose. In the
fraction 1 − p of the cases, when he plays the fair Monty
Hall textbook showmaster, you win in 1/3 of the cases if you
stay and in 2/3 if you switch. Multiplying and adding these
cases together yields that you win with playing staying in
p×1/3+(1−p)×1/3 = 1/3 of all cases. If you play switching,
you win in p× 0 + (1− p)× 2/3 = (1− p)× 2/3 of the cases.
Which strategy is better depends on p. If p < 1/2, switching
is better, if p > 1/2, staying is better, and for p = 1/2 the
strategy does not matter, you win in 1/3 of all cases.
The showmaster should make you face a fifty-fifty
chance of him being evil, as this will put you under max-
imal stress. This is what the audience wants to see and
therefore this is what the showmaster will probably aim
for. He might add or subtract a small margin, in order to
save a bit money or to make the show more attractive, re-
spectively, but this is hard for you to judge. He will make
sure that you are nearly clueless about his mood by choos-
ing p ≈ 1/2. This optimal amount of evilness is therefore
what you better assume. He will be moody just to the
level that erases any information advantage you could have
gotten from having observed his action.
The information game
The probability p = P (evil) describes your belief before
the game that the showmaster has evil intentions. During
the game the probability you assign to him being evil will
change.
If he opens the door that you initially picked and re-
veals a goat there (“my” for “he opens my door”), then you
can be sure that he is evil, P (evil | my) = 1, as the “fair”
showmaster never does this, but always opens an “other”
door, P (my | fair) = 1 − P (other | fair) = 0. We assume
here that no showmaster ever reveals the sports car with-
out you insisting on choosing its door, P (other | car) = 1,
where with “car” and “goat” we label what is behind your
initially chosen door.
In the other case, where he opens another door, the
situation is less clear. However, since some of the evil pos-
sibilities are ruled out, your confidence in him being in a
fair mood has increased. How much can be worked out
using Bayes’ theorem as we have our prior beliefs
P (evil) = p and P (fair) = 1− p
and can specify the likelihoods of the different events:
P (other | fair) = 1, P (my | fair) = 0,
P (other | evil) =
1
3
, P (my | evil) =
2
3
.
Going through the maths of Bayes’ theorem we find
P (evil | other) =
P (other, evil)
P (other)
=
P (other | evil)P (evil)
P (other, evil) + P (other, fair)
=
1
3 × p
1
3 × p+ 1× (1 − p)
=
p
3− 2 p
.
We have P (evil | other) = 1/4 for p = 1/2. Thus, having
seen the showmaster opening another door makes you more
confident in him being fair. Should you therefore trust him
and open the remaining door as now your probability of
him being evil is well below 1/2?
Not at all! You should still play carefully, as the thresh-
old of p = 1/2 was derived for the prior probability P (evil)
and not for the posterior probability P (evil | other). In
fact all that matters to you is P (car | other), the proba-
bility that the car is behind your initially picked door, ir-
respective of whether the showmaster is evil or not. This
requires you to marginalize out the momentary mood of
the showmaster, but not his action, as the latter is im-
portant information. For calculating this chance, we re-
call that P (other | car) = 1 as any showmaster, regard-
less of fair or evil, will open another door if you picked
the car. If you picked a goat, only the fair one will open
another door. This will therefore happen with probability
P (other | goat) = 1−p. The probabilities of seeing another
door opened given what is behind your door now permit us
to work out
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P (car | other) =
P (other, car)
P (other)
=
P (other | car)P (car)
P (other, car) + P (other, goat)
=
1× 13
1× 13 + (1− p)×
2
3
=
1
3− 2p
.
Thus, a showmaster with evil intentions half of the time
leaves us clueless behind which of the remaining doors the
car is to be expected, since P (car | other) = 1/2 for p = 1/2.
This value is the intuitive feeling of many people about their
chance, indicating that they also anticipate a fifty-fifty per-
cent chance of the showmaster playing evil, an option a
billion years of evolution have taught us never to forget.
Or at least, our feeling tells us that the showmaster is ma-
nipulating us and probably has erased any information we
could have obtained on the correct door.
In contrast to this, a showmaster always exhibiting the
same mood would provide you with information on the door
with the car. His message, however, would depend on his
mood. A showmaster always playing fairly (p = 0) would
leave only a winning chance of P (car | other, fair) = 1/3 for
your door, but 2/3 for the remaining door. The always evil
showmaster (p = 1) would inform us by opening another
door that we picked the right one, as P (car | other, evil) =
1 then. To benefit from this message, you would need to
have identified his mood. But beware, he might have read
your mind as well.
The mind-reading showmaster
If a fraction q = P (stay) of the guests of the show stay with
their doors and 1 − q = P (switch) of the guests switch to
the other door, the fraction of guests winning the car is
P (win) = P (stay)P (car) + P (switch)P (fair)P (goat)
= q ×
1
3
+ (1 − q)× (1 − p) ×
2
3
=
2− 2 p− q + 2 p q
3
as “stay” wins irrespective of the showmaster’s strategy
if the car is behind the initial door, and "switch" wins
if there was a goat and the showmaster plays fair. For
the optimally moody showmaster with p = 1/2 this means
P (win) = 1/3 as the guest strategy then does not matter.
The always fair showmaster is significantly more expen-
sive for the broadcasting company, as for p = 0 we have
P (win) = (2−q)/3 ≥ 1/3 and thus the switching guests dou-
ble their chance. The always evil showmaster (p = 1) saves
real money with P (win) = q/3 ≤ 1/3 as all switching guests
lose surely. However, he can follow this strategy only until
the reputation of the show is ruined.
Anyhow, such an economic winning rate could also be
achieved by a mind-reading showmaster, who adapts his
strategy to the situation. He could play fair whenever there
is a guest expected to play stay or one who will switch to
a goat. Otherwise he plays evil. Then the number of win-
ning guests would be that of the always evil master. But
the showmaster would look much more generous than the
evil one, as he opens other doors more frequently.
If the showmaster can read his guest’s mind perfectly,
the winning rate is P (win) = q/3 ≤ 1/3, but he opens other
doors in
P (other | mind-reader) = P (stay) + P (switch)P (car)
= q + (1 − q)×
1
3
=
1 + 2 q
3
of the games, more often than the 1/3 if always playing evil.
This will look generous, given that most people prefer to
stay in fear of an evil showmaster, meaning q > 1/2, which
implies P (other | mind reader) > 2/3. With a bit of mind-
reading, the showmaster can keep a reputation of being very
fair, while in fact saving real money for his company. And
in 2/3 of the games with guests that play stay, it will ap-
pear in the end that switching would have been the better
choice. This should motivate enough of the people studying
the show to use the switching strategy when they happen
to play. As those switchers will never win, they contribute
to the benefit of the company.
Is this possibility realistic? Well, a good showmaster
worth his money should be able to read his guest’s mind.
Before the game starts he interacted enough to get a good
guess on the preferred strategy of the guest. The show-
master might even manage to manipulate the guest into
adopting a certain strategy. Using this against his guest
can make him look more fair than he is in reality. And if
the showmaster is unsure, he just plays evil, to be on the
safe side.
The acting guest
There is also a counter strategy available to the guest
against the mind-reading showmaster. If the guest man-
ages to act in a way that the showmaster believes the guest
is playing stay, whereas the guest actually will play switch,
the winning chance of the guest becomes 2/3. This, how-
ever, won’t work too often, as the showmaster will certainly
recognize whenever he is being fooled. If this happens too
often, he might return to the randomized strategy. Or, if
he learns to identify the acting guests, he just plays evil on
them and they go home with only a goat. Thus the acting
guest takes a real risk. If caught, he loses for sure.
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The real show
Most people will not perform the above mathematical con-
sideration explicitly when faced with the situation of a real
game show. Their intuition, however, might take many
factors into account that the classical textbook version of
the Monty Hall problem ignores. Intuition knows that the
showmaster could have acted differently, might be evil, that
he wants to create a situation of emotional tension, and
probably wants to avoid giving away too many expensive
cars. The showmaster will likely be perceived as an expe-
rienced veteran of many such shows, being well capable of
guessing or manipulating the strategy of individual guests.
Even if told that the showmaster will always open another
door, intuition won’t put too much belief in this claim.
There is just too much circumstantial evidence coded into
our intuition of real showmasters, and other predators, to
behave differently, usually.
As the Monty Hall show is an information game, it
would be very natural for the showmaster to try to erase
any information his guest has on the proper door. The exis-
tence of such an information-erasing strategy for the show-
master might determine the ordinary guest’s intuition. If
it is possible for the show master to erase any knowledge,
he probably does so and therefore a 1/2 chance to the car
being behind their door is better assumed.
It should be said that psychology offers also another
very plausible explanation for the assignment of a 1/2
chance. It is well known that people use logical shortcuts in
their reasoning, which should also lead to the same result.
In psychological investigations of the Monty Hall problem
the “insensitivity to prior probability outcomes”, considered
by Tversky and Kahneman [5], is often mentioned as an ex-
planation of the guest’s behavior. It states that prior prob-
abilities are ignored by humans when given new evidence,
even if the new information is worthless. Transferring this
to the Monty Hall problem, one can explain why people as-
sign a 1/2 probability of winning for both strategies, switch-
ing or staying. Thus, it could well be a mere coincidence
that people’s intuition provides here a good guess for the
chances.
Still, the preference that people show for staying is not
explained by this. Staying is better in case the show master
is more evil, mind-reading, or manipulative, as it guaran-
tees a winning chance of 1/3, whereas switching risks to
always loose. The only safe strategy against the maneuvers
of the showmaster is to stay with the initial choice, thereby
ensuring that one will bring home a car in 1/3 of the cases.
The preference for staying might therefore be explained
by the distrust in the intentions of the show master. The
opening of the second door is easily perceived as an in-
tentional reaction of the show master to the guest’s move
to pick a door. Psychological studies by Schul et al. [6]
showed that people pay special attention to whether ef-
fects are caused by humans or non-humans. Humans have
intentions and these can be bad. As the human brain is
evolutionary trained to watch out for deception, the more
risky strategy to switch is disfavored, despite the 1/2 chance
assignment people make.
Thus, the apparently irrational strategy of staying turns
out to be in fact very rational, as it is immune against all
the mean tricks the showmaster might use. And the appar-
ent contradiction between people assigning a 1/2 chance –
for whatever psychological reason – to the car being behind
the other door, but strongly insisting on staying with their
chosen door is also lifted. The former is an estimate with
some uncertainty attached to it. The latter is a decision,
taking potential losses into account, which tells us that we
could be a sure loser if the showmaster is mentally above
us.
Did the real Monty Hall knew about all this? We can let
him answer this by himself [7]: "But if he [the showmaster]
has the choice whether to allow a switch or not, beware.
Caveat emptor. It all depends on his mood.”
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